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ABSTRACT
New research has identified the consequences of high rates of incarceration on
neighborhood crime rates, but few studies have looked beyond crime to examine the
collateral effects of incarceration on the social and economic well being of the
neighborhoods themselves and their residents. We assess two specific indicia of
neighborhood economic well-being, household income and human capital, dimensions
that are robust predictors of elevated crime, enforcement and incarceration rates. We
decompose incarceration effects by neighborhood racial composition and socioeconomic conditions to account for structural disadvantages in labor force and access to
wealth that flow from persistent patterns of residential segregation. We use panel
methods to examine the effects on incarceration on New York City census tracts over an
11 year period from 1985-1996, a period which saw crime rates rise and fall sharply,
and when incarceration rates increased and remained high in concentrated areas
throughout the city. We examine whether persistently high incarceration rates erode
human capital and depress median household incomes, further intensifying incarceration
risks and threatening to create conditions where incarceration and economic
disadvantage become endogenous features of certain neighborhoods. We find distinct
but overlapping effects for prisons and jails, suggesting that these are parallel processes
produced by loosely coupled law enforcement priorities. Incarceration effects are greater
for household income than human capital, suggesting a complex relationship between
persistent poverty, residential segregation, and incarceration that reinforces a classic
poverty trap. Household incomes are lower over time in neighborhoods with higher
proportions of African American population, even after controlling for the effects of race
on incarceration, but we find no similar effects for Hispanic populations. Spatially
targeted policies such as microinvestment and housing development may be needed offset
the local embeddedness of poverty and disrupt its connections to incarceration and
crime, while education policy and transitional labor market networking can strengthen
local human capital.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Research on the growth in incarceration has focused both on the sources of
incarceration and its public safety returns. The incapacitative and deterrent effects of
incarceration are fundamental rationales for the heavy fiscal burdens of mass
incarceration, and legislators have used a wide range of policy instruments to increase the
number of persons sentenced to prison and the lengths of their sentences. Recent studies
disagree on the impacts of incarceration on crime rates within states (see, for example,
Spelman, 2000; Zimring, Hawkins and Kamin, 2003; Levitt, 2003; Katz, Levitt, and
Shustorovich, 2003) or smaller areas within cities (Clear, Rose, Waring and Scully, 2003;
Lynch and Sabol, 2003; Fagan, West and Holland, 2003).
While this debate continues, a parallel line of research has started to examine the
impacts of the rise in incarceration both on inmates and the family members they left
behind and to whom they return (Nagin, Cullen and Johnson, 2009; Durlauf and Nagin,
2010). Recent studies have examined the intergenerational impacts of incarceration on
the economic and social well being of children and families (Geller, Garfinkel and
Western, 2012; Hagan and Dinovitzer, 1999; LeBlanc, 2003). Other research has
examined the challenges facing newly released inmates to avoid crime and successfully
return to community life (Visher and Travis, 2002; Travis, 2005; Petersilia, 2004). Their
re-entry is complicated by the specific effects of incarceration on work (Western 2006;
Pettit and Western, 2004) and crime (Chen and Shapiro, 2007). For example,
incarceration suppresses future earnings, especially for young African American males,
whether by diminishing their human capital that makes them marketable in the workplace
(e.g., Freeman, 1992; Pettit and Lyons, 2003), or by attaching a stigma that discourages
employers from hiring them even for low-paying unskilled labor jobs (Pager, 2003).
Incarceration increases – or perhaps coerces -- residential mobility, contributing to social
instability and detachment from supportive social networks that in turn increases crime
(Clear et al., 2003). Incarceration often is a turning point that diminishes the life
prospects for stable marriage and employment (e.g., Sampson and Laub, 1993; Laub and
Sampson, 2003: 290-92). Incarceration also excludes returning inmates from several
forms of political participation and citizenship: jury service, the right to vote, and the
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right to hold elective office (Fletcher, 1999; Maurer, 2000; Miles, 2004). The racial
concentration of incarceration means that these effects are especially pronounced for
African Americans (Maurer, 2000; Fagan, 2004, 2008).1
These studies illustrate that the consequences of incarceration extend beyond
individual effects to change the social organization and economic fortunes of
neighborhoods. Incarceration is spatially concentrated, a consequence of the spatial
clustering of crime, law enforcement, social structural risk, and racial residential
segregation (Morenoff et al., 1997; Fagan et al., 2010; Fagan and Davies, 2004;
Sampson and Raudenbush, 2004).2 A handful of studies have illustrated this spatial
concentration of incarceration, and examined whether this spatial concentration reduces
or contributes to crime (c.f., Clear et al., 2003; Fagan, West and Holland, 2003; Lynch
and Sabol, 2004).
These studies examined the reciprocal effects of crime, incarceration and
neighborhood social and economic disadvantage that are bound together in complex
neighborhood ecological dynamics. These neighborhood dynamics themselves exert
secondary or one-off effects on a range of individual outcomes including crime,
employment, school dropout, teenage pregnancy and drug abuse, often swamping any
individual effects (Sampson, Morenoff and Gannon-Rowley, 2002; Sampson, Morenoff,
and Raudenbush, 2005). In some neighborhoods, this racial-spatial concentration may
accumulate to produce collective consequences for entire neighborhoods whose effects
are well beyond what we might expect from the aggregation of individual effects of
persons within neighborhoods.
Several researchers now are examining the effects of this spatial concentration of
incarceration, including its effects on social and economic indicia of community life.
Recent theoretical and empirical work has focused on the unintended consequences of
1

Disenfranchisement disproportionately and severely affects African American males, consistent with their
distorted presence in the incarceration population: of the 3.9 million American felons who are
disenfranchised in 1999, nearly 1.4 were African American males, representing 13% of all black males
(Maurer, 2000).
2

For example, neighborhood disadvantage may invite closer surveillance by law enforcement, well in
excess of levels of surveillance and enforcement that would be predicted by crime rates alone (Fagan and
Davies, 2000, 2002), increasing incarceration risks relative to crime rates. These reciprocal patterns of
crime, enforcement and social risk sustain the elevated rates of incarceration, and appear to do so even
when crime rates decline (Fagan et al., 2003).
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incarceration not just for individuals or families, but for neighborhoods that experience
the highest rates of incarceration (Lynch and Sabol, 2004). Much of this work has
focused on the possibility that incarceration may increase neighborhood crime rates
(Clear et al., 2003; Fagan et al., 2003; Lynch et al., 2001; Lynch and Sabol, 2004). Few
(Hagan and Dinovitzer, 1999; Sabol and Lynch, 2003) have looked at the effects of
incarceration on the social and economic contexts – human capital, poverty, family and
child well-being -- of neighborhoods that are intricately bound up with incarceration and
crime (see, Crutchfield, this volume). Because crime, incarceration and neighborhood
contexts are part of a complex ecological dynamic with reciprocal effects over time,
unraveling these influences is a potentially important step in understanding the persistent
spatial concentration of incarceration that seems to be orthogonal to local crime rates. 3
In this article, we take another step in this direction. We analyze data from a
panel study of New York City neighborhoods to examine the effects of incarceration on
two indicia of the economic well-being of neighborhoods: median household income and
human capital. The research setting is New York City in the years from 1985-1996, a
period when there was a “perfect storm” of crime crises and their sequellae: epidemics of
gun violence and highly addictive drugs (Fagan, Wilkinson and Davies, 2007), economic
instability (Mollenkopf, 1995), a significant increase in incarceration per crime (Fagan,
West and Holland, 2003), and high rates of residential mobility (DeGiovanni and
Minnete, 1992; Beveridge, 2008). These dynamics disproportionately affected the City’s
minority citizens (Community Service Society, 2004). In our earlier study in 2003, we
showed that incarceration grew over time after controlling for the crime rate and for law
enforcement. The stability of incarceration in the face of declining crime rates illustrated
the endogeneity of incarceration in the most disadvantaged neighborhoods. But
neighborhood economic strength was one of the factors that protectively insulated
neighborhoods from the spiraling crime-incarceration dynamic.
Accordingly, we examine here whether in fact the dynamics of incarceration
adversely affect the social and economic resources of the City’s neighborhoods, and
embed neighborhoods in the endogenous dynamics of crime, incarceration and
3
See, for example, Fagan, West and Holland, 2005, showing the persistence of incarceration rates over
time that are independent of local crime rates, even after accounting for the endogeneity of crime,
incarceration and social structural disadvantage in New York City neighborhoods.
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disadvantage. We examine whether incarceration exhibits negative effects on
neighborhood well-being using two dimensions of neighborhood economic status,
median income and human capital. Both are robust predictors of elevated crime,
enforcement and incarceration rates. We use a panel design to examine the effects on
incarceration on New York City census tracts over an 11 year period from 1985-1996, a
period which saw crime rates rise and then fall (Karmen, 2000; Fagan, Zimring and Kim,
1998; Bowling, 1999; Zimring, 2006), but an era when incarceration rates rose steadily in
concentrated areas throughout the city. We ask whether persistently high incarceration
rates erode human capital and depress incomes, intensifying incarceration risks and
threatening to create conditions where incarceration and economic disadvantage are
endogenous features of certain neighborhoods.

II. BACKGROUND
Neighborhoods exert strong effects on a wide range of social behaviors (for a
review, see Sampson et al., 2002), including crime (Fagan, 2008). These effects
influence the social and economic behaviors not only of their residents, but also residents
of the surrounding areas through dynamics of diffusion or contagion of neighborhood
effects (Reordan et al., 2008; Reordan and Sullivan, 2004; Grannis, 1998).
Neighborhood effects capture the intricate interplay between social structure, social
organization, and social control that combine to influence individual behaviors. Interest
in neighborhood effects has produced new research on small area variations in child
development and child maltreatment, domestic violence, teenage sexual behavior and
childbearing, school dropout, home ownership, several indicia of health, suicide,
disorder, drug use and adolescent delinquency (see, for example, Coulton, Korbin and
Chow, 1995; Miles-Doan, 1998; Crane, 1991; Gould et al., 1990a, 1990b; Brooks-Gunn
et al., 1993; Rowe and Rogers, 1994). Moreover, evidence of the spread of social
behaviors from one neighborhood to the next suggests that element of social contagion
may also explain variation in crime rates over time (Fagan and Davies, 2004).
Here, we focus not on the neighborhood effects on individuals, but instead on the
effects of incarceration on the ecology of neighborhoods and their developmental
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trajectories over time. We assume that neighborhoods (like people) are dynamic entities
that change over time, and that these transformations are likely to lead to complex
outcomes of crime and other indicia of social and economic life.
A small number of studies use panel methods to examine these interactions within
neighborhoods over time, identifying complex interactions and (non-recursive) feedback
processes between crime and the social dynamics and compositional characteristics of
neighborhoods (c.f., Bellair, 2000).4 Some neighborhood change studies have examined
the reciprocal influence of adjacent neighborhoods on crime rates. For example, Taylor
and Covington (1988), Morenoff and Sampson (1997), and Heitgerd and Bursik (1987)
all identified dynamics where crime or violence in one area influenced homicide rates in
adjacent areas over time. Taylor and Covington examined gentrification as a trigger for
crime, while Heitgard and Bursik used a similar strategy to show that show that even
stable, well-organized communities can have high rates of delinquency when the adjacent
neighborhoods experienced rapid racial change. Other studies have identified turning
points in neighborhoods that precede the onset or intensification of crime. Bursik and
colleagues (Bursik and Webb, 1982; Bursik, 1984; Bursik and Grasmick, 1992, 1993)
analyzed neighborhood change in Chicago’s 74 planning areas to identify turning points
in the natural history of neighborhood development to pinpoint when crime rates change
and grow.
In this article, we are concerned with the effects both of endogenous social
dynamics – including crime, economic activity, and stratification – and exogenous shocks
to these systems through public policy choices. The fact that incarceration has elements
of both – endogeneity with crime, exogeneity with policy choices – is both a conceptual
and analytic challenge. That is, the specific question is how incarceration, which is both a
response to crime within neighborhoods but also a public policy choice produced by
factors exogenous to the neighborhoods, affects the developmental history of
neighborhood economics. If the affects are salutary, then we might conclude that
incarceration produces the ancillary benefits of promoting neighborhood resilience to
4

Physical and social deterioration is a persistent theme of neighborhood change in several studies (Taub,
Taylor and Dunham, 1984; Schuerman and Kobrin, 1986; Harrell and Gouvis, 1994). Deterioration often
cued citizens to leave previously stable areas based on changes in their subjective evaluation of the
likelihood of crime affecting them personally.
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crime while at the same time reducing one of the main sociological culprits in local crime
rates. But we might also worry that if incarceration adversely affects neighborhoods, the
criminal justice policies producing incarceration may actually worsen and reify the social
and economic risks of crime and other social behaviors, creating an internal equilibrium
that will sustain incarceration over time and resist incremental policy changes meant to
disrupt it.
Incarceration and Neighborhood Crime
Three studies have shown that the risks of going to jail or prison grow over time
for persons living in poor neighborhoods. In a panel study of New York City
neighborhoods from 1985-96, Fagan et al. (2003) showed that neighborhoods with high
rates of incarceration invited closer and more punitive police enforcement and parole
surveillance, contributing to the growing number of repeat admissions and the resilience
of incarceration even as crime rates fall. They included measures of both prison and jail
admissions, emphasizing how even short term incarceration in local facilities contributed
to further incarceration. Using growth curve models and controlling for the endogeneity
of crime, incarceration and social structural disadvantage, they concluded that
incarceration produced more incarceration net of crime, and that incarceration was
associated with increasing crime. The engine for the growth in incarceration was drug
enforcement, which continued to resupply incarceration (Fagan, West and Holland, 2003,
2005). These dynamics spiraled over time in a reciprocal dynamic that at some tipping
point is likely to reach equilibrium. The dynamic becomes self-sustaining and
reinforcing, and continues even as externalities such as labor market dynamics or
population structure undergo significant change, as well as in the face of declining crime
rates and receding drug epidemics.
In the second study, based on data from a two-wave study neighborhoods in
Tallahassee, Florida, Clear et al. (2003) showed a positive relationship between the rate
of releases one year and the community’s crime rates the following year. They showed a
dose-response relationship between prison admissions and crime -- low rates of prison
admissions had non-significant effects on local crime rates, moderate prison admission
rates produced modest effects on crime, and the neighborhoods with the highest rates has
6

the strongest increase in crime. Provocative as it may be, their study overlooked
endogeneity of crime and incarceration that would lead to intercept differences in the
neighborhoods at the outset of the panel and weaken the causal claim. That is, higher
incarceration rates may simply respond to higher crime rates, or the two may be
spuriously related to the factors that produced these intercept differences (i.e.,
simultaneous equation bias).
The Tallahassee study was silent on causal mechanisms, such as incarceration
impacts on informal social control or community organization. These mediating
mechanisms were an explicit focus in a study by Lynch and Sabol (2004) of crime,
incarceration and social organization in 30 Baltimore communities. Lynch and Sabol
examined the effects of neighborhood incarceration rates on community social cohesion
and informal social control in the 30 neighborhoods, and ultimately on crime. They
tested whether incarceration lessens the capacity of communities to engage in social
control, which in turn could increase crime rates. They identified the discretionary
component of law enforcement – one of the primary engines of incarceration (see, also,
Fagan et al., 2003) – through an instrumental variables model to estimate the effects of
law enforcement (arrest) on incarceration net of crime.5 They showed that incarceration
rates reduced feelings of community solidarity, and undermined neighborhood residents’
willingness to join in the types of neighborhood activities that are critical elements of
collective actions to reduce crime. At the same time, incarceration seemed to promote
informal social control, a neighborhood benefit that can produce an effective response to
crime.6 Their results leave complicated lessons, though perhaps these lessons could be
unraveled by sorting out the effects on communities with different baselines of collective
action and crime.

5

That is, they computed the portion of the rate of drug arrests in each neighborhood that was not explained
by the index crime rate
6

The positive effect of incarceration on informal social control may, at first glance, be unexpected. Lynch
and Sabol suggest that changes (increases) in incarceration rates encourage informal social control through
mechanisms such as fear reduction. Because they failed to find that incarceration promotes interactions
with residents, they suggest that the incarceration/informal social control linkage operates through
individuals: “Residents may see or know of persons being incarcerated for crime, and this may increase
their confidence in engaging in informal social control. They may feel that the “bad guys” are gone and that
the criminal justice system is working with them to increase safety” (Lynch and Sabol, 2004:24).
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The common ground in both studies is the indictment of incarceration as a
negative influence on community organization and informal social control, a perverse
consequence that may produce more and not less crime. Rose and Clear (1998)
hypothesized that concentrations of incarceration may disrupt social networks by
damaging familial, economic, and political sources of informal social control, mortgaging
the community’s social capital and also the social ties of the persons living there
(regardless of whether they had been to prison). In their 2003 study, Clear et al. identify
the mechanism for the erosion of social cohesion and social capital (also noted by Lynch
and Sabol) as coercive mobility. This is a dynamic process of residential mobility that is
induced by high rates of removal to and return from prison. Such mobility has long been
implicated in higher crimes in communities (c.f., Shaw and McKay, 1943), but more
recent updates of this theory pinpoint the mechanisms by which mobility raises the risk of
crime (see, for example, Bursik, 1988; Fagan and Davies, 2004). Rose and Clear suggest
that coercive mobility undermines the less coercive and more influential institutions of
social control, such as families, community associations, and a community’s capacity to
enforce norms to defend against crime (see, for example, Bursik and Grasmick, 1993).
These dynamics are compounded systemically by the mobility of citizens who are victims
of crime,7 citizens who might otherwise be participants in social regulation. Thus, the
churning effects of prisoners coming and going with limited job prospects every time
they return may contribute systemically to the mobility that increases the risks of crime.
High rates of incarceration may reduce incentives for citizens to participate in
informal social control by reducing the communicative value of sanctions, delegitimizing law and legal actors, further inviting crime and intensifying the crimeenforcement-incarceration-crime cycle (Fagan and Meares, 2003; Uggen and Manza,
2004). High rates of imprisonment raise questions of the legitimacy of government and
undermine incentives to comply with the law (Sherman, 1993 Tyler and Huo, 2002). The
racial and neighborhood asymmetry in punishment offers a stark contrast to the claims of
legal actors that law is fair and legitimate. If local residents reject the claim that prison
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See, for example, Laura Dugan and Robert Apel (2002) on the coerced mobility of women who flee from
violent relationships with intimate partners.
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sentences are fairly distributed across races and neighborhoods, they may conclude that
the policy the produces the unfair distribution is illegitimate (Fagan, 2004).
Incarceration and Neighborhood Economic Well-Being
Much of what we know about the adverse effects of incarceration on individuals’
prospects in the legal labor market come from large and small panel studies of former
inmates. We were unable to locate studies of the effects of incarceration on the aggregate
social or economic well-being of neighborhoods as a function of the rates of removal to
prison or jail.
The panel studies agree that the prospects for stable employment and future
earnings of former inmates are dim (Freeman, 1992; Fagan and Freeman, 1999; Western
and Pettit, 2000; Western, 2006). As time spent in prison increases, the subsequent
likelihood of disengagement from the legal economy increases (Freeman, 1996; Grogger,
1995; Hagan, 1991). Once out of prison, a criminal record disadvantages low-skill and
other workers attempting either to enter the labor force or to improve their earnings
(Pager, 2003). Western and Beckett’s (1999) study of incarceration and unemployment
found that although growing levels of incarceration initially produced lower rates of
conventional measures of unemployment, the recycling of these ex-offenders back into
the job market with reduced job prospects had the effect of increasing unemployment in
the long run. Western (2002) estimates that the earnings loss associated with prison
ranges between 10 and 30 percent, and serving time in prison is also associated with
decreased earnings growth.
Some studies have looked at the aggregation effects of concentrated incarceration
on labor market outcomes. Western et al. (2001) and Western (2006) showed that
incarceration not only lowers the work prospects of former inmates, but that the spatial
concentration of incarceration may aggravate social and economic disadvantages by
compounding individual barriers to meaningful employment for released prisoners and
their peers (Western et al., 2001: 414). These aggregate effects become a collective
problem in neighborhoods marked by high incarceration, decreasing the prospects for
desistance by returning inmates (Western 2001; Laub and Sampson, 2004) while
increasing crime risks for others living in the same areas.
9

Incarceration potentially stigmatizes neighborhoods, complicating the ability of
local residents to access job hiring networks to enter and compete in labor markets
(Granovetter, 1973, 1974), and deterring businesses from locating in those areas
(Granovetter, 1974). The stigma evidently is not lost on employers. Holzer, Raphael and
Stoll (2004) show that employers are more reluctant to hire former prisoners than welfare
recipients. Both welfare recipients and inmates are spatially concentrated in poor
minority neighborhoods, so the imbalance in employer preferences is even more striking.
Thus, job scarcity, even for low-skill jobs, will likely add to the concentration of
economic disadvantage in neighborhoods that already lag behind others in employment
and earnings.
In their Baltimore study, Sabol and Lynch (2003) examined labor force
participation using releases from prison as a proxy for incarceration rates. Using racespecific models, they show found that release rates were positively and significantly
related to unemployment for blacks but the opposite was the case for whites. Disruption
of these local networks of social control and economic activity can mean that the long run
consequences of incarceration will be to increase crime (Lynch and Sabol, 2004). The
secondary effects of incarceration are diffused to others in neighborhoods with spatially
concentrated incarceration. Low earnings and employment by returning prisoners burden
families since former inmates have less ability to bring money to families, and less to
spend on essential services in their communities.
Lynch and Sabol (2004:273) argue that “[incarceration] can also reduce the
earning power of family left behind because they must tend to tasks formerly performed
by the incarcerated family member. In the long run, incarceration will have negative
effects on the economic life of the community by reducing the ability of returning
inmates to obtain jobs and higher salaries.” This prediction is reinforced when we
consider the employer preferences shown by Holzer and colleagues.
Incarceration and Family Integrity
One would expect incarceration to be a turning point in the lives of men in several
ways that increases their crime risks. Not only are they disadvantaged in the worklplace,
but their ties to their children and families suffer, eroding an essential form of emotional
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and social support that has strong effects on criminal activity (Sampson and Laub, 1993;
Laub and Sampson, 2004). Recent studies offer evidence that imprisonment damages the
ties between incarcerated men and women, their families, and their communities (Hagan
and Dinovitzer, 1999:122; Geller et al., 2012). These effects further burden the efforts of
former inmates to avoid crime once back in their communities, but also their capacity to
supervise and raise children.
Researchers have focused on the fates of families and children, with inferences
about communities based on the concentration of incarceration and the aggregation of
individual effects. In Random Family, LeBlanc (2003) reports on a social and familial
network of Latino families and neighbors. Her ethnography showed how incarceration
can weaken families by removing men from existing families, by reducing the supply of
marriageable men in the neighborhood, and in turn attenuating or skewing family
formation toward unstable couplings (LeBlanc, 2003; see also Wilson, 1996). Her work
shows the effects of incarceration on the capacities of families as socializing agents for
children, and less able to supervise teenage children.
Edin, Nelson and Paranal (2004) show that incarceration influences the ties
between imprisoned men and their children in several ways. In life history studies with
men with low job skills in two cities, they identify a group of men whose ties to their
children – ties that were strong prior to incarceration -- were disrupted by their
imprisonment. Fathers in this group were less able to supervise their children and
maintain parental ties that important to preventing children’s involvement with the law
(Geller et al., forthcoming). For some men, incarceration disrupted the destructive
behaviors that had weakened their ties to their children in the years before prison. For
this group, prison offered the chance for a different kind of turning point. For others,
having children provided an incentive to avoid crime and raised the costs of crime and
legal trouble. But incarceration also disrupted the economic role of those men whose
criminal activities were an important income source for their children and partners. For
these men, incarceration not only strained family ties but also family economic well
being. Fatherhood increased the pressures to provide materially for their children, not just
with strollers and playpens when they are younger, but for clothes and shoes when they
become children and adolescents. Yet the workplace stigma of incarceration kept many
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of these men out of even low wage legal work and contributed to their return to crime
(Edin et al., 2004).
Several studies show that children of incarcerated parents have poorer emotional,
behavioral and psychological development than other children ( Wildeman, 2010; Murray
et al., 2009; see, Johnson and Waldfogel, 2002, for a review of earlier work). Even when
parent behaviors prior to incarceration have had negative influences on child
development before an incarceration event, these studies show that the effects of
incarceration are also observed once the parent leaves home for prison. One pathway to
adverse child development is through removal to foster care. Children with an
incarcerated parent are more likely to be placed in foster care where developmental
outcomes are uncertain, and the disruption of parental attachment can have serious
developmental consequences (Johnson and Waldfogel, 2004; Geller et al. forthcoming).
These effects fall more heavily on non-white families, and especially on African
American families. Myers (2000) argues that the high rates of incarceration of African
American males contribute to the higher prevalence of black families headed by single
women in predominantly African American neighborhoods. Lynch and Sabol (2003)
estimate that increases in incarceration of black men were associated with about 20% of
the increase in the number of black families headed by single women during the 1980s.
And when men go to prison in high rates in poor minority neighborhoods, the supply of
marriageable men declines, suppressing the marriage rate. As Wilson (1996:104)
explains, “both inner-city black males and females believe that since most marriages will
eventually break up and since marriages no longer represent meaningful relationships, it
is better to avoid the entanglements of wedlock altogether.”
When women go to jail or prison, the children of African American incarcerated
mothers are far more likely to be placed with another family member or in foster care
compared to white women, even after controlling for differences in social position
(Johnson and Waldfogel, 2004: 123). One consequence, then, of higher incarceration
rates is strain on the child welfare system. The spatial concentration of incarceration will
focus these systemic strains in small social areas with limited foster care resources and
supervisory or regulatory capacities.
Incarceration and Local Social Control
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Recent work with incarcerated males and the “fragile families” they leave behind
suggests that incarceration disrupts family ties and social networks, aggravating
vulnerabilities to crime through compromises to social control, in turn creating a
churning effect on social networks (McLanahan and Sandefur, 1994; McLanahan and
Bumpass, 1998; Geller XXXXX). Social organization and social control are spatially
embedded processes that influence neighborhood-level variations in violence (Morenoff
et al., 2001). Thus, rising and concentrated rates of incarceration not only become a part
of the fabric of poor communities, already susceptible to crime, but they compromise the
limited forms of social control that poor communities can mount.
Informal social control is essential in the regulation of crime (Grasmick and
Bursik, 1993). But social control is intricately tied to social structure, supporting citizen
activities – social regulation – that can sustain or inhibit crime (Sampson et al., 1997).
When economic conditions are weak, the strains of everyday life can compromise the
participation of local residents in social regulation. Thus, rising and concentrated rates of
incarceration not only become a part of the fabric of poor communities, already
susceptible to crime, but they compromise the limited forms of social control that poor
communities can mount. If these effects extend to neighborhood economic well-being,
the strains on residents’ capacity for social control reinforce the crime-incarceration
dynamics well observed in other studies.
This Study
The negative consequences of concentrated incarceration in poor neighborhoods
may offset its public safety benefits (Fagan et al., 2003). The cascade of negative
consequences may corrode the ecological dynamics of neighborhood social control, in a
way that actually may elevate crime risks over time (Lynch and Sabol, 2004; Clear et al.,
2003; Fagan et al., 2005). Here, we reverse the question, and estimate the effects of
incarceration on neighborhood economic fortunes as part of the influence of incarceration
on the ecology of social control. We suspect that higher incarceration is associated with
lower income and less human capital at the tract level.
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We suggest that the spatial concentration of incarceration can influence attenuate
a neighborhood’s economic fortunes through three possible mechanisms (Fagan et al.,
2003): (1) incarceration complicates the efforts of individuals to forge links to legal work
(Hagan and Palloni, 1990; Fagan and Freeman, 1999; Pager, 2002; Holzer et al., 2004);
(2) concentrated incarceration compromises social control in multiple ways by increasing
the number of single-parent households, reducing the number of older males, and by
straining citizens’ relationships to law and social control (Lynch and Sabol, 2004; Myers,
2000); and (3) the concentration of incarceration in poor, predominantly minority
communities can also lead to voter disenfranchisement which may adversely affect the
political economy of neighborhoods (Maurer, 1999; Uggen and Manza, 2002; Uggen,
Manza and Behrens, 2003). In addition, high rates of incarceration may mark a
neighborhood as risky or high crime, and attract recurring and intensive police attention
that sustains the elevated risks of police action.
With these mechanisms in mind, we present analyses on the effects of
incarceration on the economic fortunes of neighborhoods. First, we present trends in
incarceration and crime for New York City census tracts for the period from 1985-1996,
the most recent era of sharp increases in incarceration in New York City and State (Fagan
et al., 2003). Next, we show the effects of incarceration on two indicia of neighborhood
economic well-being: median household income and human capital in a series of
regression models that take advantage of the panel structure of the data. We include jail
populations in addition to prison populations, a dimension of incarceration that has been
neglected in much of the research on incarceration. We use the homicide victimization
rate as a proxy for the overall crime rate (see: Maltz, 1998). We include a series of
control variables that capture the dimensions of neighborhood social control and social
structure, and that themselves are bound up with both incarceration and crime. To
estimate temporal effects, we include interactions of time with each of these predictors.

III. RESEARCH SETTING AND METHODS
Crime and Incarceration in New York City
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Trends in crime and incarceration in New York City from 1985-97 provide the
backdrop for understanding how incarceration shapes the economic fortunes of
neighborhoods. Crime rates rose in New York beginning in 1985 concurrent with the
onset of the crack epidemic and the emergence of street drug markets that themselves
were flashpoints for violence and other crimes (Fagan et al., 1998; Karmen, 2000;
Harcourt and Ludwig, 2006). Table 1 shows that violent crime rose 29.1% from 198590, and the total index crime (i.e., major felonies) rate rose by 18.0%. Starting in 1991,
crime fell sharply, by nearly 50% for index crimes and 46.7% for violent crimes.
Incarceration rates rose and fell concurrently with changes in crime rates, though
the trajectories were quite different. Prison sentences rose 89.0% from 1985 to 1990,
rising more quickly than the crime rates.8 Prison sentences then declined by 19.2%
through 1997, a rate slower than the decline in crime. The steadily increasing rates of
prison sentences per reported crime, arrest and conviction – during periods of both
increase and decline in crime -- showed the change in the rise in the propensity for
incarceration within the criminal justice system in New York City. The effect of these
changes in punishment norms was sharp and sustained growth in New York State’s
prison population. The state prison population rose from 25,000 in 1985 to 55,000 in
1990 and then to nearly 70,000 in 1997 (Fagan et al., 2003).9 Most – about 70% -- of the
state’s inmates come from New York City.
The jail population grew more slowly than did the prison population after 1985,
but continued to grow as prison populations declined in the 1990s. The City’s average

8

Over the past decade, New York City has experienced a steady decline in crime rates that ranks among the
largest decreases of any American city. The total number of homicides dropped from a record high of
2,262 in 1990 to 606 in 1998—the lowest homicide count since 1964. As the number of homicides
declined steadily, other serious crime was also dropping, but not at the same rate. From 1990 to 1995,
reported index crimes declined by nearly 40%, from 711,556 to 442,532. Within two more years, index
crimes dropped further to 356,573, an overall decline of nearly 50% from its peak in 1990. Overall, the
total number of index crimes in New York City dropped by fifty percent between 1990 and 1997 and
violent crimes dropped by forty-seven percent (Fagan, West and Holland, 2003). However, felony arrests
dropped by only twelve percent, and misdemeanor arrests increased by seventy-three percent in the same
period, despite the dramatic decrease in overall crime numbers.
9
In 1987, 75% of all NYS prison admissions originated from cases disposed in New York City, 69% in
1990, and 69% in 1994. NYS Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) and National Corrections
Reporting Program (NCRP).
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daily jail inmate population was 17,897 in 1999, a small decline from the 1990
population of 19,643 when crime rates were twice as high (Piquero et al., 2005).10
The engine for the growth and stability of incarceration – in the face of declining
crime rates – is aggressive enforcement of drug laws, especially street-level enforcement
resulting in large numbers of felony arrests of retail drug sellers (Fagan et al., 2003).
Aggressive street enforcement and drug enforcement programs such as Operation
Pressure Point, the Tactical Narcotics Teams, the Street Crimes Unit, and Operation
Condor produced consistent high rates of felony drug arrests since the mid-1980s (see,
for example, Letwin, 1990; Herman, 199_; Sviridoff et al., 1992; Belenko and Fagan,
1993; Greene, 1999; Rashbaum, 2000; Fagan and Davies, 2000; Ketham, 2002) Despite
the dramatic decreases in crime in New York City, drug-related arrests continued to
increase each year through the late 1990s.11 For most of the 1990’s, drug-related offenses
accounted for an increasing proportion of New York State prison admissions: from just
12% of all New York State prison admissions in 1985, to 31% in 1990, to 38% in 1996.12
Because these inmates are likely to serve long sentences under New York’s “predicate
felony” laws, drug offenders comprised a growing proportion of the city’s and state’s
incarcerated population (Fagan et al., 2003).
Data
To estimate the effects of incarceration on neighborhood economic fortunes, we
used a longitudinal panel of incarceration, crime, enforcement and social structure in
New York City census tracts for the period from 1985 to 1997 (Fagan et al., 2003). We
obtained a twenty-five percent sample of all individuals sentenced to prison and a five
10

New York City Department of Correction (DOC). On-line data report:
http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/doc/html/avrdaily.html.
11

From 1990 to 1997, misdemeanor drug arrests in NYC were steadily increasing—accounting for twentyseven percent of all misdemeanor arrests in 1990 to thirty-one percent in 1997. During the same period,
felony drug arrests remained relatively stable—accounting for approximately thirty two percent of all
felony arrests. New York State, Division of Criminal Justice Services, Criminal Justice Indicators By
Percent Change New York City: 1990-1997,
http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/crimnet/ojsa/areastat/areast.htm (last visited May 30, 2003).
12

United States Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Corrections Reporting Program,
1985, 1990, and 1996: United States [computer file]. Conducted by U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of
the Census. ICPSR ed. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research
[producer and distributor].
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percent sample of all jail sentences for cases with dispositions in New York City for the
years 1985, 1987, 1990, 1993 and 1996. This yielded an annual sample of prison
sentences of 2,000 to 4,000 individuals, and an annual sample of jail sentences of 3,000
to 4,000 individuals. Records of persons admitted to prisons or jails were geocoded by
residential address of the incarcerated person. Geocoded cases and crime counts were
aggregated to each census tract. Rates of crime and incarceration were then computed for
each census tract.
We used homicide victimization rates as a proxy of crime generally (Maltz, 1998,
1999), and to account both for base rates of the supply of individuals available for
incarceration, and the endogeneity of crime with incarceration and neighborhood social
organization (Morenoff et al., 2001; Fagan and Davies, 2004). Unfortunately, the New
York City Police Department does not make available crime data for geographically
precise areas such as neighborhoods or census tracts. 13 Instead, we used data on
homicide victimization from the Office of Vital Statistics of the New York City
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. Deaths are recorded by the Office of the
Medical Examiner after classifying injuries as either intentional, accidental or selfinflicted. Neighborhood rates were estimated by aggregating from individual cases that
were geocoded to the census tract using residential address of the victim, and using a
population denominator for each year in the time series.14
To address the specific and theoretically significant contribution of drug
enforcement on incarceration, we constructed a time series on drug arrests as a measure
of the intensity of drug enforcement and as a proxy for the locations and intensity of drug
13

Beginning in 1994, the New York City Police Department launched a computerized crime mapping
system, COMPSTAT (Bratton & Knobler, 1998). Crime data before 1994 cannot be located to specific
addresses other than through manual geocoding of complaint and arrest records, or manual coding of the
records of arrestees. Even after the launch of COMPSTAT, these data were unavailable for research
purposes, but were used internally for strategic analysis of enforcement practices. One reason is that the
spatial coordinates were obtained only for the initial crime complaint, which often was unverified at the
time it was incorporated into the database. NYPD officials were reluctant to release these data, since many
of the complaints had not been investigated. For example, a complaint of a gunshot might turn out on
investigation to be a car backfiring. Or a burglary could simply be a missing personal item that was later
recovered. Once verified, complaints were entered into the city’s crime counts, but for unstated reasons,
the geographical coordinates of the crime location were not carried forward or aggregated.
14
Although using residential address in lieu of event location may distort the spatial estimates for violent
events, we based this decision on prior work showing the close proximity of homicide events to the
residences of victims. See, for example, Fagan and Wilkinson, 1998; Fagan, 1999.
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markets (Baumer et al., 1998; Ousey and Lee, 2002). This time series was created by
obtaining a ten percent sample of drug arrests from 1985-97 from the New York State
Division of Criminal Justice Services (see, Fagan and Davies, 1992). Each arrest record
was geocoded to the residential address of the arrestee and then assigned to each type of
spatial unit. We aggregated arrests for drug possession, drug sales, and possession with
intent to sell into a single measure of drug arrest as a measure of overall police
aggressiveness in drug enforcement that was independent of the changing enforcement
priorities that influenced the separate indicia over time.
Data on human capital, household income, and other measures of neighborhood
social organization were obtained from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 census files (U.S.
Bureau of the Census, Summery Tape File 3A). Census tracts equivalencies were
developed to adjust for changes in census tract configuration the three Census iterations.
Data for between census years were linearly interpolated.

Measures
Neighborhood economic well-being is measured along two dimensions: median
household income and human capital. Human capital is an index of three items, derived
from principal components factor analysis of educational attainment (percent high school
graduates), labor force participation (weeks worked by persons16 and over in past year),
and job skills (percent 16 and over with skilled occupation) (see, Fagan et al., 2003).
These are indicia of work experience and labor market skills that tend to increase
earnings (e.g., Becker, 1991), and are consistent with earlier indicia of human capital
(e.g., Sanders and Nee, 1996). We used a Z-score for median household income, rather
than applying uncertain cost-of-living or inflation estimators to this measure, we
preferred to use the standardized measure that aligns each observation with other
observations (tracts) in the panel in a consistent metric over time and overcomes
differences in the skew and variance within each panel.
We used propensity scores of incarceration to identify the “treatment effects” of
incarceration on neighborhood economic status. Propensity scores are commonly used to
adjust for biases resulting from the non-random allocation of subjects to treatment
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exposures (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Rosenbaum, 2002). In this case, incarceration
is not randomly allocated across the city’s census tracts, and the “dosages” of
incarceration similarly reflect non-random differences in crime, social structure and law
enforcement across (Fagan and West, 2003). In this case, propensity scores for both
prison and jail are the estimated probability of the allocation of the “treatment” to each
neighborhood. Propensity scores thus control for the endogeneity of crime, social
structure and law enforcement, as well as other unobserved confounding variables. We
used separate equations to estimate jail and prison propensity scores for each tract in each
year of the panel.
Following Rubin (1997), we used a set of theoretical predictors to estimate the
propensity scores that differed from those used to test the primary research questions.
This allows for greater flexibility in model specification than the typical adjustments in
regression-based model estimation techniques, and more effectively reduces biases
resulting from confounding among predictors that is a recurring problem with
observational data (Rosenbaum, 2002). Ideally, we would want the functional form of the
propensity score analysis to be determined by the data, but in this case, the extreme skew
in incarceration rates by tract dictated that we use a log transformation and a linear
model.
Accordingly, we estimated ordinary least squares regressions for logged jail and
prison rates, with predictors including homicide, drug arrests, and a series of social
structural factors that are well-identified in criminological research on crime and
punishment (c.f., Land et al., 1990; see, Fagan and Davies, 2004, for a review).
Following Land et al. (1990), we sorted 18 tract-level variables along seven dimensions –
poverty, labor market, segregation, supervision, anonymity, immigration, and housing
structure – that characterize the dimensions of concentrated disadvantage articulated in
the theoretical and empirical literature linking neighborhood effects with indicia of social
adversity and isolation including crime (see, for example, Sampson et al., 2002; Bursik
and Grasmick, 1993). For each census year, we used principal components analysis with
varimax rotation to construct a factor score for each dimension. Appendix A shows the
item loads and factor scores for each dimension for 1990. We imputed factor scores for
the between-census years to construct a score for each year.
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From the regression models, we generated the predicted value for jail and prison
rates for each period to estimate the effects of incarceration on neighborhood economic
status over time. The results are not shown, but are available from the authors. The
explained variance in each model exceeds .60, a sign that a large fraction of the
explanatory power of incarceration is attributable to other factors that are associated with
incarceration, and better isolates the effects of incarceration by removing the effects of
potentially confounding variables.
To estimate the effects of concentrated prison incarceration, census tracts were
sorted for each year into quartiles. First, for each year, we included all tracts with no
incarceration events in a “no event” group. The remaining tracts were sorted into
quartiles.15 We also computed the percentage of population for African Americans and
non-white Hispanics in each tract in each year. Alternate specifications of the estimation
models included these measures to examine race-specific effects, and also to control for
the demographic concentration of incarceration in New York City within these two
minority populations (Fagan et al., 2003).

Analysis
We estimated growth curve models using random effects regression methods16 to
examine incarceration effects on neighborhoods (Little et al., 1996; Singer, 1998;
Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002; Singer and Willett, 2003). We included the propensity
scores for incarceration, with controls for the homicide rate (lagged one year and logged),
the drug arrest rate (lagged one year and logged), the population over age 15 (logged),
and the social control factor. Models were estimated with random intercepts. We
emphasize social control because of its central role in theoretical and empirical work on
the effects of incarceration on communities (Grasmick and Bursik, 1993; Rose and Clear,
1998; Lynch and Sabol, 2004). As shown in Appendix A, this measure is a factor score
15

We estimated models with dummies for the two highest quartiles as “high incarceration” tracts, and with
the top quartile as “very high incarceration.” Models were estimated substituting these indicia of prison for
the actual prison rates. The results were robust to these specifications.
16
Separate models were estimated with either fixed and random effects, and a Hausman test was employed
to test for the choice between the two kinds of models. Models with fixed versus random effects produced
similar results though coefficients varied in magnitude but not significance.
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that combines the concentration of youth population, the percent of female-headed
households with children below 15, and the ratio of youths to adults. The general model
is

where Yit is economic measure of each census tract i for each time period t, Yi is the mean
of Y over time for each tract, and X is a vector including the incarceration propensity
scores and other predictors.
We include time as both a fixed and random effect: time is included as a random
effect to account for the panel structure of the data, and as a fixed effect to account for
the specific year within the panel. We include an interaction term of time by each
predictor to estimate their specific longitudinal effects. In this form, the main effect
represents the average effect of the predictor across the time series, and the interaction
with time as the longitudinal effect. We focus on the latter to identify the cumulative
longitudinal effects of incarceration.

IV. RESULTS
Patterns and Trends
Figures 1 and 2 show the concentration of prison admissions and their relationship
to income and human capital in New York City neighborhoods. Figures 1a and 1b
compare prison admissions by median household income for two periods: 1985-90 and
1993-96, periods of increasing and then declining crime in New York City; Figures 2a
and 2b similarly compare incarceration with human capital. The patterns show the strong
inverse correlation for each economic indicator with the rate of prison admissions: prison
admissions are concentrated in neighborhoods with the lowest incomes and the lowest
human capital. The figures also show the stability of incarceration by neighborhood
during two distinctly different crime eras. Despite strong crime declines in New York
City, prison admissions were concentrated in the same neighborhoods.
Figures 3 and 4 and Tables 2 and 3 show change over time in household income
and human capital using quartiles to group neighborhoods according to their
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concentration of prison incarceration. The patterns for jail quartiles are similar (data not
shown). The unadjusted median household income rose over the study period in each of
the quartiles plus the no-incarceration group, however there is less fluctuation when the
values for income are standardized. Figure 3 shows the adjusted median household
income (Z-scores) over time and Table 2 show the general trend in income unadjusted for
inflation. Over the panel, neighborhoods with the highest incarceration have the lowest
median household income. Although there is some fluctuation between the two highest
and lowest household income, the neighborhoods with highest incarceration rates had
lower household incomes over time. The concentration seems, at first glance, to be stable
in the face of changing externalities such as declining homicide rates and changing
property values. In neighborhoods with no incarceration events, the adjusted median
income appears flat. As expected, the rise in household income was greater in the
neighborhoods with no incarceration and slowest in the areas with the highest rates of
prison admissions. There are slight difference in between the observed pattern in the the
two highest and lowest quartiles. But these differences in slope appear to be marginal.
The temporal patterns for human capital were less consistent across quartiles. As
with household income, none of the lines cross, indicating stability in the relative position
of neighborhoods over time in the distribution of human capital across the city that seems
invariant to changes in crime rates or other economic or social externalities. Table 3 and
Figure 4 show a slight increase in human capital through 1991 for the neighborhoods
with no incarceration, and then a slight decline. For the first quartile, those
neighborhoods with the lowest incarceration rates, human capital remained stable across
over time. In the second and third quartiles, human capital increased through 1991 before
declining slightly through 1997. The trend in the fourth quartile differed: human capital
rose slightly before declining sharply and then rising slightly again in the last period in
the study interval.
Incarceration Effects: Model Estimation
Models were estimated in four ways to more specifically identify the effects of
both jail and prison on neighborhood economic status. Models for jail and prison were
estimated separately. Models with both jail and prison were then estimated to examine
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their additive effects on economic measures. The fourth model examined their
conditional effects by including an interaction term that combined jail and prison
admissions. We included race-specific measures of neighborhood demography. Each set
of models included first-order interactions of each predictor with time to examine the
effects over time of incarceration and the other predictors.17 Descriptive statistics for the
variables used in the models are shown in Table 4.
Incarceration Effects on Household Income
Table 5 shows incarceration effects across four model specifications for
neighborhood (median) household income. In these, we pay attention both to the direct
effect of incarceration and the interactions between the incarceration “treatment” and
time. Incarceration in general, but jail more specifically, has an economically
destabilizing effect on neighborhoods. When estimated separately prison and jail have
significant negative effects on communities’ economic fortunes: higher rates of all
forms of incarceration depress household incomes. When estimated together, jail
continues to decrease a neighborhood’s household income, but prison, while still
negative, fails to reach significance. The positive interaction terms between time and
incarceration suggest that overtime these negative effects are significantly amplified.
In the first three models, there are no significant effects for blacks. Higher
percentages of Hispanics, however, are associated with lower household income, and the
effects increase over time. The effect of race sustains separately from its contributions
through the propensity score estimations for jail and prison, perhaps owing to the scale of
race effects on neighborhood economic status relative to highly variable incarceration
rates by census tract.
In the conditional model, the coefficients for jail and prison are still negative and
significant the interaction term is positive and significant. However, there is little change
in the explanatory power of the additive and conditional models. There is no change in
the R2 between the jail only model and the additive model and only a very modest gain in
17

Alternate specifications included race-specific incarceration measures, and models that included a
dummy for whether the neighborhood was in the highest quintile of incarceration rates to identify whether
effects were concentrated at the extremes of the distribution of jail or prison rates. The results were
unchanged.
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explained variance in the conditional model. In these data, then, there is little evidence of
interactions between jail and prison: the effects appear to be neither conditional nor
interdependent, nor are they additive in their effects on neighborhood incomes.
The opposing effects of jail and prison are not surprising as a matter of crime
control and neighborhood ecology. Admissions to jail and prison are processes that occur
concurrently though perhaps sustained by distinct patterns of policing and enforcement.
In New York, jail admissions result from enforcement of quality of life crimes and lowlevel misdemeanors, consistent with order maintenance policing strategies (Harcourt,
2001; Greene, 1999), whereas drug enforcement and other anti-crime activities are more
likely to produce prison-generating felony arrests (Fagan et al., 2003). Nevertheless, the
models estimating the propensity scores suggest that the two incarceration processes are
concentrated in similar if not identical neighborhoods. In fact, their bivariate correlation
averaged over the study interval is .914. Including both prison and jail in the same model
(Table 5, columns 3 and 4) may conceptually more accurately capture the dynamics of
incarceration within neighborhoods than is portrayed by separate models, but the
coefficients are almost indistinguishable from other specifications., The additive and
conditional models produce similar results, and in both estimations, the effects for jail
and prison each decrease a community’s economic outlook.

Incarceration Effects on Human Capital
The effects of prison and jail admissions on human capital follow a similar
pattern. The main effects of prison and jail models (Table 6, column 1 and 2) are
significant and negative. However, neither jail nor prison is significant in the additive and
conditional models. We see that the effects of incarceration for both the jail and prison
models are amplified over time. Again, combining measures of incarceration have no
additional explanatory power. There are positive and significant race effects for the
proportion of the population that is black. This is distinct from the result predicting
household income, where the influence of the proportion of the population that is black
was negative, but failed to reach statistical significance. Rather than suppressing human
capital, when incarceration is controlled for, tracts with a higher proportion of the
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population that is black had more human capital. However, this effect is diminished over
time. The proportion of the population that is Hispanic is not significantly associated
with human capital.
V. DISCUSSION
Recent work on the collateral effects of incarceration has focused on the fortunes
of individuals returning from prison, and on the social and psychological well-being of
those left behind. Only a few studies have attended to the collective fates of
neighborhoods with elevated incarceration rates, and most of these projects have
examined how incarceration patterns contribute to the endogenous and spiraling
relationship between crime and incarceration. Given its unique and heavy individual
costs, the emphasis in incarceration research has been primarily on prisons, with little
attention to frequent though shorter-term stays in local jails. Here, we address each of
these dimensions of research on incarceration.
Loosely Coupled Enforcement
We find distinct, yet, consistent, effects for prisons and jails, suggesting that these
separate processes based on loosely coupled law enforcement priorities and penal
strategies have a distinct impact on communities in New York City. Heterogeneous
policing regimes in New York City created separate streams of prisoners eligible for
prison and jail. During much of the study period, prison populations were driven by
street drug enforcement aimed at low-level dealers (Fagan et al., 2003; Sviridoff et al.,
1992; Jacobson, 2005). This enforcement strategy was carried out by elite police units
such as the Tactical Narcotics Teams, known locally as TNT (Sviridoff et al., 1992;
Fagan, 1994: Kleiman, 1992). TNT units were assigned to broad areas of the City rather
than specific precincts. They made tens of thousands of felony drug arrests each year
beginning in 1988 and continuing through 1992, heavily populating prisons with felony
drug offenders, changing the offense composition of prisons (Letwin, 1990; Herman,
1999; Fagan et al., 2003). But jail populations were driven by enforcement of
misdemeanor laws, including lesser drug crimes and local enforcement of incivilities and
minor drug crimes. Uniformed patrol officers assigned to precincts, without the
organizational attention or status that was conferred on the specialized street drug details,
25

were the front lines in this less visible but persistent enforcement strategy.

However, it

would seem that the jail removals have had the more profound and lasting impact on
communities.
Only for the last of the waves in this panel – 1996 – had New York’s Order
Maintenance Policing been implemented, which switched the priorities from felony drug
enforcement to enforcement of a variety of forms of low-level disorder crimes, including
tens of thousands of misdemeanor marijuana arrests (Maple and Mitchell, 2000). But the
enforcement dichotomy remained. Like TNT, the elite Street Crime Unit under OMP
searched for guns and violent offenders, while uniformed patrol officers emphasized
misdemeanor arrests (Spitzer, 1999; Fagan et al., 2010).
So, even after the onset of OMP strategies, we still see the notion of loosely
coupled police regimes producing different arrest streams that influenced jail and prison
populations separately. While the Street Crime Unit concentrated its efforts in high crime
areas, predominantly poor neighborhoods with higher crime rates and concentrations of
non-white residents, lower level enforcement of disorder was a citywide campaign that –
although skewed somewhat toward poor areas – affected residents of neighborhoods
across the City. Race seems work differently for different communities of color. After
controlling for prison and jail removals the size of the black population does not
significantly influence the income outcome of communities, but the Hispanic population
does. It is possible that there are a number of ecological forces at work, including
enforcement strategies that disproportionately targeted Hispanic communities.

Race

effects are different for human capital than for income. The Hispanic population is not
related to a communities human capital, but the black population is in unanticipated way.
Two Kinds of Poverty Traps
Incarceration effects are more pronounced for household income than human
capital, suggesting perhaps different ecological explanations and policy pathways. The
negative effects of imprisonment rates on aggregate household income are illustrative of
the complex but systemic relationship between persistent poverty, crime and
incarceration. Jail and prison have lasting effects on incomes which persist over time.
Incarceration in prison seems to give rise not only to more imprisonment (Fagan et al.,
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2003), but also to lower incomes. Jail serves not only as a pathway to prison, but a
profound destabilizing influence on communities. The reinforcing spiral of poverty,
crime and incarceration describes what Sampson and Morenoff (2006) characterize as a
poverty trap (see, also, Fagan 2008). High rates of neighborhood imprisonment can have
multiple effects that sustain the downward pressure on local incomes: tainting nonoffender residents who seek jobs as crime risks, burdening returning inmates with
reduced prospects in the workplace, and reducing the attractiveness of such
neighborhoods for economic or housing investments.
The effect of jail on incomes is suggestive of the increasing reliance on the use of
jail as an enforcement strategy across the City’s residential neighborhoods. Places with
high jail rates are characterized if not by high rates of low-level crime, then by at least
low-level social disorder of the kind that attracts law enforcement attention and a kind of
enforcement that removes people for short, but disruptive periods. The repetitive high
rates of removal to jail of low-level offenders from poor communities followed by their
quick release creates a churning effect on neighborhoods that destabilizes social control
and instills a sense of chaos and disorder more typical of a pristine version of broken
windows theory (Wilson and Kelling, 1982; Kelling and Cole, 1996; Livingston, 1997;
Maple and Mitchell, 2000; Waldeck, 2000; Harcourt, 2001). Also, jail populations often
are socially and psychologically troubled, and their interrupted presence in struggling
communities is unlikely to aid the efforts of residents in those areas to develop
economically or become socially cohesive (Jacobson, 2005). They too have dim
prospects in the workplace, but their diffusion across neighborhoods dilutes their
concentrated effects on local incomes.
Race effects on income work in unanticipated ways and require further analyses.
While prison and jail are concentrated in predominately poor and segregated
communities, once incarceration factored out of the equation difference in the
proportions of African Americans was not related to incomes, but there was a lasting
negative influence on neighborhood fortunes. We observed greater for neighborhoods
with higher proportions of Hispanics. Hispanics not only have a wider income
distribution than African Americans in New York City, but they also tend to live in less
segregated areas (Kasinitz et al., 2008). Immigrants in New York are now a higher share
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of Hispanic neighborhoods and populations than other ethnic groups, and their spatial
spread and economic diversity may explain at least some of the story in this differential.
Beyond these factors, more research is needed to further decompose the crime,
incarceration and economic conditions of Hispanics.
Human capital effects are less sensitive to incarceration effects than are
incarceration effects on incomes. Human capital, including both workplace activity and
educational capital, may be more sensitive to education policy than to incarceration or
crime policy, and that may explain the narrow effects of incarceration on human capital.
Both educational status and workplace experience are components of our measure of
human capital, and the effects of incarceration may be unequal for these separate
dimensions. High rates of imprisonment or jail removal will deplete the workplace
prospects both of those who have gone to prison or jail as well as their neighbors. Again,
the effects are direct as well indirect through adverse forms of neighbor network effects,
as neighborhood stigma affects both former prisoners and others in high incarceration
places. Not only are those removed to jail or prison likely to have low educational
attainment, but they also are unlikely to find remedial services in overcrowded and
underfunded prison systems and jails.
Policy Linkages
Spatially targeted policies such as microinvestment and housing development
may be needed offset the local embeddedness of poverty and disrupt its connections to
incarceration and crime. New York experienced a housing boom in the years after this
study period, and that boom is concurrent with further crime declines (Fagan and Davies,
2007; Schwartz et al., 2003). At the same time that residential real estate rose in value,
so too did the value of commercial real estate, suggesting the emergence of sustainable
small businesses in the neighborhoods with high crime and incarceration rates. The fact
that crime fell more rapidly and steeply in these places may reflect these factors, beyond
any regression effects. Policies that encourage these forms of economic development can
offset or surpass the negative effects of imprisonment, while education policy and
transitional labor market networking can strengthen local human capital.
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Human capital may also be sensitive to these types of economic development
policies, as well as to education and crime control policies. One connection may be in
the use of Order Maintenance policing strategies in schools that result in high rates of
suspension and expulsion for both violations of school rules and low-level crimes. The
public safety benefits of such a strategy are tempered by the risk of attenuated
educational capital for older adolescents and young adults attempting to enter the
workforce. While microinvestment may provide work opportunities, the attenuation of
educational capital in poor neighborhoods may offset these chances and block access to
these new workplaces. And the deterioration of education and training programs in
prisons – and their non-existence in jails – may further compound the human capital
deficits of those going to and returning from spells of incarceration. While these two
policy options can leverage local resources to offset the adverse effects of incarceration,
ignoring the economic consequences of incarceration has its own risks.
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Table 1. Crime and Punishment, New York City, 1985-1997
1985

1990

1995

1997

% Change
1985-1990

Reported Crime
Total Index Crimes
Violent Crimes
% Violent Crimes

602,945
135,305
22.4

711,556
174,689
24.6

442,532
114,180
25.9

356,573
92,866
26

18.0
29.1
9.8

(40.9)
(31.4)
16.1

(49.9)
(46.8)
5.7

Sentences
Total
Prison
Jail
Jail + Probation

75,264
10,802
61,839
2,623

92,261
20,420
66,035
5,806

79,845
18,353
55,957
5,535

93,141
16,490
71,508
5,143

22.6
89.0
6.8
121.3

23.8
52.7
15.6
96.1

1.0
(19.2)
8.3
(11.4)

Incarceration Rates
Prison Sentences per 100
Index Crimes

1.79

2.86

4.15

4.62

59.8

158.1

61.5

Prison Sentences per 100
Felony Prosecutions

35.5

37.2

42.9

44.5

4.8

25.4

19.6

Prison Sentences per 100
Convictions

7.2

12.8

10.5

8.8

77.8

22.2

(31.3)

Jail Sentences per 100
Misdemeanor Arrests

50.7

60.6

33.9

37.4

19.5

(26.2)

(38.3)

Source: New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, various years.
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% Change
1985-1997

% Change
1990-1997

Figure 1a. and 1b. Prison Admissions and Median Household Income by Census Tract, New York City
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Figure 2a. and 2b. Prison Admissions and Human Capital by Census Tract, New York City

38

Table 2. Median Household Income by Incarceration Quartiles, 198697, New York City Census Tracts (Means, Standard Deviations)
Year
Quintile

1986

1988

1991

1994

1997

No Events

28,523

32,740

38,354

41,890

44,039

(10535)

(12241)

(14320)

(16197)

(16568)

1

24,022
(8195)

28,917
(10597)

34,389
(12733)

36,720
(12280)

40,047
(17943)

2

21,706
(8961)

25,186
(10888)

31,171
(10946)

33,250
(11361)

34,654
(12197)

3

17,709
(8095)

21,058
(9550)

24,704
(10776)

26,162
(10988)

28,715
(13908)

4

14,832
(7373)

17,621
(8977)

18,790
(10715)

20,066
(9816)

22,198
(14212)

24,675

27,972

32,218

35,012

37,821

(10815)

(12527)

(14584)

(15854)

(17526)

Total

Source: Bureau of the Census, STF 3A, Interpolated for Reconciled Census Tracts 1980-2000
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Table 3. Human Capital (Factor Score) by Incarceration
Quartiles, 1986-97, New York City Census Tracts (Means,
Standard Deviations)
Year
Quintile

1986
0.261
(0.854)

1988
0.283
(0.870)

1991

1994

1997

0.316
(0.841)

0.335
(0.800)

0.302
(0.826)

1

0.288
(0.931)

0.317
(0.868)

0.409
(0.898)

0.334
(0.893)

0.253
(0.933)

2

-0.143
(0.896)

-0.096
(0.921)

0.051
(0.786)

0.037
(0.845)

-0.063
(0.861)

3

-0.583
(0.875)

-0.485
(0.869)

-0.432
(0.918)

-0.483
(0.859)

-0.477
(0.918)

4

-0.940
(0.840)

-0.870
(0.929)

-1.049
(0.844)

-1.053
(0.796)

-0.958
(0.881)

Total

0.001
(0.966)

0.000
(0.978)

0.000
(0.987)

0.000
(0.964)

0.000
(0.968)

No
Events

Source: Bureau of the Census, STF 3A, Interpolated for Reconciled Census Tracts 1980-2000
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics
________________________________________________________________________
Mean
Std. Dev.
Minimum Maximum
Median Household Income
31,541
15,208
4,757
177,088
Population > 15
3018
2361
16
34079
Percent African American
26.2
32.1
0.0
100.0
Percent Non-White Hispanic
22.6
21.9
0.0
100.0
Prison Rate*
2.4
4.3
0.0
114.1
Jail Rate*
7.9
18.2
0.0
421.1
Drug Arrest Rate*
9.6
19.9
0.0
619.8
Homicide Victimization Rate†
0.24
0.36
0.0
6.5
Poverty/Inequality (Factor)
0.0
1.0
-3.1
3.1
Human Capital (Factor)
0.0
1.0
-5.1
3.0
Segregation (Factor)
0.0
1.0
-2.8
1.7
Social Control (Factor)
0.0
1.0
-5.2
4.9
Anonymity (Factor)
0.0
1.0
-3.4
8.9
Immigration (Factor)
0.0
1.0
-1.8
4.5
Housing Structure (Factor)
0.0
1.0
-3.4
13.7
________________________________________________________________________
* Rate per 10,000 persons
†
Rate per 1,000 persons

42

Table 5. Random Effects Regression of Jail and Prison on Median
Household Income (Z-score) by Census Tract, 1986-97 (Coefficients, p(z))
Prison
Only
Main Effects
Prison (propensity)
Jail (propensity)
Interaction
% Black
% Hispanic
Effects Over Time
Prison (propensity)
Jail (propensity)
Interaction
% Black
% Hispanic
Model Statistics
R2

χ

2

(Wald)
2

p (χ )
Rho

Jail
Only

Additive
Effects

Conditional
Effects

-.224***

-.121
-.188***

-.057
-.949***

-.005
-.918***

-.360***
-.276***
.065***
.332***
-.517***

-.448***
-.078
-1.037***
.036***
-.036***
.008

.648
3595.10
.000
hjih .928

.014***

.026
.011**

-.024***
.015**

-.029***
.012**

.662
3694.45
.000
.928

.662
3749.04
.000
.926

.058*
.007
-.000
-.036***
.001

.688
4742.71
.000
.911

All models include random effects for time, population size, social control, human capital, drug
arrest rate (logged), homicide rate (logged). All models estimated with random intercepts and
robust standard errors
p(z) : *** p<.001 , ** p < .01, * p < .05
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Table 6. Random Effects Regression of Jail and Prison on Human Capital
by Census Tract, 1986-97 (Coefficients, p(t))
Prison
Only
Main Effects
Prison (propensity)
Jail (propensity)
Interaction
% Black
% Hispanic
Effects Over Time
Prison (propensity)
Jail (propensity)
Interaction
% Black
% Hispanic
Model Statistics
R2

χ

2

(Wald)
2

p (χ )
Rho

Jail
Only

Additive
Effects

-.055*

-.002
-.058

.656***
-.156

.668***
-.154

-.116*
.657***
-.168
.026*
.004*
-.028***
-.032***

.732
3123.05
.000
.892

-.028***
-.032***

.732
3023.45
.000
.896

-.008
.006
-.026***
-.030***

.733
3392.95
.000
.886

Conditional
Effects
-.092
-.070
-.026
.708***
-.121
.028
.012**
-.006**
-.038***
-.042***

.736
3683.06
.000
.884

All models estimated with fixed effects for time, population size, social control, drug arrest rate
(lagged, logged), homicide rate (lagged, logged). All models estimated with random intercepts.
p(t) : *** p<.001 , ** p < .01, * p < .05
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Appendix A. Neighborhood Factor Composition, 1990
Rotated
Coefficient
Poverty/Inequality
%Households with Public Assistance Income
%Households with Income Below Poverty
Gini for Total Household Income

0.97
0.95
0.61

Labor Market/Human Capital I
%College Grads-Persons 25 and Over
%Labor Force Participation-Persons 16 and Over
Employment Rate-Persons 16 and Over
Skilled Occupation-Persons 16 and Over

0.88
0.88
0.92
0.86

Segregation
Racial Fragmentation Index
% Nonwhite

Eigenvalue

% Explained
Variance

2.20

73.29

3.14

78.43

1.51

75.62

2.34

77.88

1.04

52.16

1.64

81.86

1.61

80.61

0.87
0.87

Social Control I -Supervision
% Youth Population (5-15)
% Female Headed Households with Children <18
Supervision Ratio (25-64 | 5-24)
Social Control II –Anonymity
Population-1990
Residential Mobility-Same House as 1985

0.94
0.85
-0.86
0.72
0.72

Immigration and Cultural Isolation
Foreign Born
Linguistic Isolation

0.91
0.91

Housing Structure
% Rental Housing
Housing Density (persons per room)

0.90
0.90

45

